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China has been undertaking a number of transactions with various countries 
referred to as “loan-for-oil” deals since 2009. In these deals, China extends a loan to a 
certain oil exporting country and expects loan repayments in the form of oil shipments at 
market prices. The aim of this thesis is to identify China’s motivations behind loan-for-oil 
deals. This paper analyzes each of two hypotheses separately. The first hypothesis is that 
“If China enters into loan-for-oil deals, then it is aiming to build friendships with oil-
resource rich countries to advance its objective of energy security”. The second 
hypothesis is that “If China enters into loan-for-oil deals, then it is looking to diversify its 
financial investments from US treasury bills and views these deals as credible alternative 
investments”. The paper rejects both the hypotheses based on the information discussed 
in the thesis: the loan-for-oil deals do not enhance China’s oil linked energy security, nor 
are they a viable diversification from investments in U.S. treasury bills. However, by 
offering subsidized loans with relaxed conditions to oil exporting countries post the 2008 
financial crisis, China is using these deals as an apparatus to develop friendships with oil 
exporting nations, thereby highlighting its interest in oil as a commodity. It can be 
speculated that the friendships formed as a result of these deals may contribute towards 
China's oil linked energy security goals in the future, however proving this conjecture is 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
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Today, it is difficult to imagine that China, the world’s second largest oil 
importer, was a net petroleum exporter until 1992. Since then its increasing population 
and high rates of GDP growth have led to a surge in demand for oil. China is the most 
populous country in the world with a population of 1.351 billion as of 2012 (The World 
Bank , 2012). The population growth rate over 1992 is about 15.37%. China’s GDP grew 
from $488.22 billion in 1992 to $8.229 trillion in 2012, reflecting a growth of 1,586% 
(China Statistical Yearbook , 2012). Increased GDP has led to an increased demand for 
oil. In 1992, China consumed 2.736 million barrels of oil per day and exported about 
109,000 barrels of oil per day. By 2012, China consumed 10.221 million barrels of oil per 
day and imported 6.066 million barrels of oil per day. The oil consumption grew by 
273.57 % over just two decades (BP, 2013). 
The International Energy Agency defines “energy security” as the “uninterrupted 
availability of energy sources at an affordable price” (IEA, 2014). The biggest energy 
security related challenge facing the Chinese government is to secure large quantities of 
oil without having a drastic effect on global oil prices.  
Since 1992, in order to meet its growing demand for oil, China has made various 
types of investments domestically and internationally.  Internationally, it has bought 
shares in producing fields in various oil producing countries, undertaken service and 
construction contracts for upstream and downstream activities, been involved in projects 
for the construction of major pipelines for transporting oil, and acquired shares in energy- 
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and oil-related corporations. More recently, since 2009, China has been undertaking a 
number of transactions referred to as “loan-for-oil” deals. These deals are unique, as they 
provide subsidized loans of substantial amounts to oil exporting countries, and in return 
along with the repayment of the loan comprise an additional oil sale agreement that 
guarantees China a certain quantity of oil sale at market prices over the term of the loan. 
This has been a fundamental bone of contention:  So long as one can acquire oil at market 
prices, why is there a need to subsidize loans? The aim of my thesis is to identify China’s 
motivations behind loan for oil deals. For the purpose of analysis, I will lay down two 
initial hypotheses and analyze each hypothesis in turn before reaching my conclusion. 
The two hypotheses are:  
If China enters into loan-for-oil deals, then it is aiming to build friendships with 
oil-resource rich countries to advance its objective of energy security. 
If China enters into loan-for-oil deals, then it is looking to diversify its financial 







This section aims to provide a background of various loans-for-oil transactions 
executed by China in the past few years. It will highlight the different countries with 
which China has entered into loan-for-oil deals, along with discussing the projects these 
loans were extended for.  The deals are organized in order of the geographical location of 
the loaned countries, starting from Russia in the East and ending in Ecuador in the West. 
Later in this thesis, three of the deals presented in this section will be analyzed in greater 
detail to gauge China’s motivations behind these deals by testing the hypotheses laid 
down in the previous section.  
On 17th of February 2009, after 15 years of talks and negotiations, China entered 
into a loan-for-oil deal with Russia. It provided Russia a loan of $25 billion for 25 years 
($15 billion to Rosneft, an integrated oil company owned by the government of Russia, 
and $10 billion to Transneft, an oil transporting company controlled by the Russian 
Government) with an oil sale agreement of 301,000 barrels of oil per day over the next 25 
years (Jiang & Cinton, 2011). The $25 billion dollar loan to Russia was intended to 
finance an extension of the Russia Siberia-Pacific pipeline that flows towards China 
(Energy Daily, 2009). One year later, after the extension of the pipeline had been 
constructed; Rosneft started shipping crude oil via the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean 
(ESPO) oil pipeline. The pipeline transported oil from Skovorodino to Mohe on the 
Chinese border (Chicago Tribune, 2014). Since then, China has entered into loan-for-oil 
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deals with eight countries: Angola, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Russia 
and Venezuela (Jiang & Cinton, 2011).  
In June 2013, China transacted a $270 billion loan-for-oil deal with Russia for a 
period of 25 years. In return, China was to receive 300,000 barrels of oil per day over the 
next 25 years as a part of the pre-sale oil agreement (Bloomberg, 2013). This deal is 
expected to double the amount of oil exports from Russia to China. Some reports state 
that Russia will decrease its oil exports to Europe, which it views as a stagnant market, 
and increase its exports to China, the second largest oil importer. The pre-payment of the 
deal was about $70 billion, which is more than Russia’s current total of $54 billion net 
debt. The deal was signed at the International Economic Forum, and Russian President 
Vladimir Putin labeled the deal “unprecedented” (Bloomberg, 2013).  
China has also transacted such deals with oil-resource rich African countries like 
Angola. In 2011, the Angolan finance minister confirmed that Angola had received loans 
from China totaling $9 billion for infrastructure construction purposes. Out of $9 billion, 
$7.5 billion were backed by oil sale agreements. In the case of Angola, China also wanted 
to acquire shares in various oil exploration projects. Every time the Angolan government 
agreed to China having access to its oil equity, China provided an extension for the 
repayment of the loans. These loans continued to be backed by oil sale agreements. For 
example, China acquired a 50% stake in Block 18 in Angola after it extended its first 
loan. A joint venture agreement was signed between China and Angola for the 
exploration of the block (Alves, 2013). Block 18 is estimated to have reserves of 750 
million barrels (www.offshore-technology.com).   
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In May 2009, China loaned Brazil $10 billion dollars for a period of ten years. 
The purpose of the loan is to finance a part of Brazil’s pre-salt business plan 2009 – 2013, 
specifically oil exploration and production activities in Brazil worth $174.4 billion 
(Bloomberg, 2009). Brazil has a pre-salt reservoir off its southeastern coast known as the 
Libra field that is estimated to have reserves of about 50 billion barrels, or about 20 
percent of the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia. Pre-salt oil lies deep inside the earth below a 
layer of salt that is thousands of meters thick and is difficult and costly to extract. The 
layer of salt is further buried under layers of rocks that are thousands of meters thick and 
are present at the bottom of the ocean at a depth of 2,000 meters below sea-level (Forbes, 
2013). Brazil in turn agreed to supply China 150,000 barrels of oil per day for the first 
year, and 200,000 barrels of oil per day at prevailing market prices for the next nine years 
(Bloomberg, 2009).   
In April 2010, China entered into another deal:  It loaned Venezuela $20 billion 
for a period of 10 years as a part of a 25-year joint-exploration agreement. In return, 
Venezuela agreed to sell 200,000 barrels of oil per day at market prices to China over the 
next ten years. The joint venture is for the purpose of upstream and downstream activities 
to produce crude heavy-oil in the Junin 4 block of Orinoco Belt. The project is expected 
to yield a total of 2.9 billion barrels of extra heavy crude oil. Initially, in 2012 the Junin 4 
block was expected to produce 50,000 barrels per day, which would eventually increase 
to 400,000 barrels per day by 2016. Hugo Chávez, the then President of Venezuela, 
stated: “The relations between China and Venezuela extend from below the surface of the 
earth to outer space”. “We’re producing oil together and our satellite is out there in space. 
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This is a changing world in transition” (Bloomberg, 2013). This statement by the 
Venezuelan president demonstrates how this loan-for-oil deal enhanced Sino-Venezuelan 
relations and paved the way for future oil trade   co-operation.   
 A report by Bloomberg Businessweek estimated that since 2007 China has 
loaned Venezuela up to $42.5 billion for various projects that were backed by oil sale 
agreements. Of that total, $12 billion was loaned in a short time span of 15 months during 
a time when it was difficult for Venezuela to borrow money from the international market 
due to the global recession. The loaned amount accounts for almost 25% of Venezuela’s 
total international loans (Devereux, Forsythe, & Sanderson, 2012). The table below gives 
an account for the various purposes of the loans that are mostly secured by future oil sale 
agreements of various amounts. 
 
(Devereux, Forsythe, & Sanderson, 2012) 
Figure 1: CDB loans to Venezuela since 2007 
 7 
Ecuador in 2008 had a $3.2 billion debt default due to its difficulties raising 
external financing. In November 2012, China lent Ecuador $2 billion dollars against oil 
sale agreements in the future. Chinese funds are expected to finance 61% of Ecuador’s 
budget deficit. In return China has oil sale agreements accounting for almost 90% of 
Ecuador’s future oil exports. “This is a huge and dramatic shift,” said Rene Ortiz, a 
former Ecuadorean energy minister and secretary general of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries. “Never before has Ecuador committed its oil to a lender” 
(Financial Post , 2013). China’s oil backed deals with Ecuador started in 2009, when 
Ecuador approached China for a $1 billion advance payment for a guaranteed supply of 
69,000 barrels oil per day for the next two years (Financial Times , 2014). Although this 
was not a typical loan-for-oil deal, it led to many subsequent loan-for-oil deals. Note that 
the term “oil-backed” for these deals means that a certain quantity of oil is promised to be 
sold to China in the future, not that the oil serves as collateral for the loan. By April 2010, 
China purchased about 33% of Ecuador’s total oil exports and more recently, i.e. by mid-
2013, China bought about 83% of Ecuador’s exported oil. The Chinese “provide 
financing for our country and, in exchange, we ensure sales of oil at international prices,” 
Ecuador’s then-Finance Minister Patricio Rivera told state-run TV earlier this year” 
(Financial Post , 2013).   
From the discussion above, it is noted that China has transacted loan-for-oil type 
of deals with eight different resource-rich countries across three different continents in 
varying amounts. In the next section, China’s international petroleum policy and the 
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China’s International Energy Policy  
 This section aims to discuss some key points of China’s International Energy 
Policy and to describe China’s major National Oil Companies (NOCs) and Government 
Banks. To test the hypotheses stated earlier, it is important to understand the structure of 
the transactions and how these loan-for-oil deals were conceived. The Chinese NOCs and 
Government Banks are major players in the execution of loan-for-oil deals and are 
directed to act in line with China’s international energy policy. This section discusses the 
policies that led to international exploration, the government entities involved, and the 
structure of the deals.  
Since the early 1990’s, the government’s key energy policy priorities have been to 
increase the level of imports to meet the growing domestic demand and to diversify the 
sources of these imports. As a result, the Chinese government has endorsed the quest for 
oil by the Chinese National Oil Companies (NOCs) (Speed & Roland, 2011). 
International exploration was initially a difficult task, as previously the NOCs were not 
exposed to the political risks that arose with investing abroad, and they had no experience 
in drilling on foreign soil (Alves, 2013). It was only at a later stage that the government 
devised policies that encouraged the NOCs to expand internationally (Jiang & Cinton, 
2011). Today however, China has a separate section for “Strengthening International Co-
operation in Energy” as a part of its Official Energy Policy.  
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In its Energy Policy document, China acknowledges that it cannot meet its 
development goals without international co-operation and is therefore aiming for closer 
energy ties with the rest of the world. It states that 
“For a fairly long time to come, international energy trade will remain the major 
way by which China utilizes foreign energy sources. China will improve policies for fair 
trade and optimize the trade structure, and conduct energy imports and exports in 
accordance with the WTO rules. It will diversify the modes of trade and comprehensively 
use such methods as futures trade, long-term agreements and barter trade. China will 
actively participate in global energy management. It will intensify exchanges and 
cooperation with other countries, addressing together the impact of the international 
monetary system, excessive speculation and energy market monopoly, thereby 
maintaining the stability of international energy market and energy price” (The People's 
Republic of China, 2012).  
 
China also highlights three main areas for ensuring global energy security. First it 
emphasizes strengthening dialogue and exchanges among energy exporting, consuming 
and transiting countries. Second it supports mutually beneficial co-operation in 
international energy exploration. It calls on the developed to countries to transfer 
technology to developing countries for a more energy-secure world. Third, it calls for the 
international community to work together to maintain peace and security in the oil-
exporting and oil-producing regions such as the Middle East and to avoid any geo-
political clashes. In order for China to support dialogue and exchanges, it is a part of 
many energy-related multi-lateral organizations such as the World Energy Council, 
International Energy Forum and G-20 (The People's Republic of China, 2012).  
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I. STRUCTURE OF CHINA’S NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES (NOCS):  
Initially, China’s important petroleum-related decisions were centralized at the 
federal level, and local governments and petroleum corporations had little or no influence 
in centralized decision making.  In the early 1980’s, under reforms, the Chinese 
government abolished line ministries for petroleum corporations, decentralized petroleum 
decision making and instead formed National Oil Companies that were responsible for 
petroleum-related decisions and the profit and loss associated with them (Kong, 2010). 
The main objective of forming these NOCs was to introduce competition amongst them 
for more efficient economic results that would lead to greater tax revenues for the State 
(Jiang & Cinton, 2011). Although the current structure of NOCs is not completely 
autonomous from the State, it has led to greater efficiency and profitability (Kong, 2010).  
There are three major NOCs: China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC/PetroChina), China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). CNPC mainly focuses on upstream 
activities, and Sinopec focuses on downstream, although they may both be involved in 
upstream and downstream projects. The third NOC, CNOOC, is an offshore exploration 
and production company. CNPC and Sinopec in terms of reserves and production are 
similar to the largest International Oil Companies (IOCs) and other NOCs. CNOOC is of 
a comparable size to a medium IOC or NOC (Speed & Roland, 2011).   
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 (Speed & Roland, 2011) 
Figure 2: Comparative Data for Chinese NOCs 
The above table shows that CNPC and Sinopec have comparable profit margins to 
the world’s leading International Oil Company (IOC), ExxonMobil, but have much 
higher profit margins than other IOCs such as Shell and BP. Given that China has 
 13 
limited petroleum reserves at home, it is commendable that the Chinese NOCs are 
comparable to leading IOCs and NOCs in the world.  
The three NOCs were also geographically divided by the State in China, although 
now that the quest for international oil has taken precedence, the domestic boundaries 
have been blurred. Northern China is controlled by CNPC, Southern China is controlled 
by Sinopec, and CNOOC is responsible for offshore production activities (Jiang & 
Cinton, 2011).  
A distinguishing factor of Chinese NOCs as opposed to other NOCs is that 
Chinese NOCs may make decisions in line with State policies, but they are not run by the 
State even though they are owned by the State. The purpose of decentralization was to 
make profitable oil corporations, and the government encourages healthy competitions 
amongst the three entities (Jiang & Cinton, 2011).  
II. STRUCTURE OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT BANKS:  
Before the 1994 reforms, the four major Chinese banks were responsible for 
commercial and policy-based lending. These banks were Agricultural Bank of China 
(ABC), Bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CBC) and the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). As a part of the 1994 reforms, the Chinese 
government formed three new banks for fulfilling policy objectives, and the four 
mentioned above were designated to lend on a purely commercial basis (Gallagher, Irwin, 
& Koleski, 2012).  The three new policy lending banks were China Development Bank 
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(CDB), China Export-Import Bank (China Eximbank) and Agricultural Development 
Bank of China (Downs, 2011).  
The Chinese government decided to separate policy and commercial banks, as it 
did not want the commercial banks to have an excuse for being not competitive in the 
market due to their efforts to achieve policy objectives. This did not mean that the three 
new policy banks did not have profitability as an objective. All state-owned firms in 
China have profitability as one of their key objectives. Erica Downs states that China 
Development bank along with having profitability as one of its major goals also focuses 
on developing a competitive international portfolio of investments and strives to be one 
of the best banks in the domestic Chinese market (Downs, 2011). The next section will 
discuss how the NOCs, the policy banks and the Chinese government work together to 
transact these loan-for-oil deals. A graphical representation of the organization of the 
Chinese government, NOCs and banks is as follows:  
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(Jiang & Cinton, 2011) 
Figure 3: State-Owned Enterprises and Government of China 
III. STRUCTURE OF LOAN-FOR-OIL DEALS:  
 There is a common misconception about the loan-for-oil deals that China extends 
loans to resource-rich countries and the loan is repaid by exporting a certain quantity of 
oil to China for a defined number of years in the future (Alves, 2013). In fact, the loan-
for-oil deal is a combination of two separate agreements: it comprises a loan agreement 
and an oil sale agreement between two countries’ state-owned banks and oil companies. 
The worth of the oil guaranteed is usually much more than the combined size of the loan 
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allotted plus interest payments due (Gallagher, Irwin, & Koleski, 2012). There are three 
main players involved in these deals: a Chinese NOC, a borrowing country NOC and a 
Chinese policy bank. In these deals, so far only Sinopec and CNPC have been involved 
from the Chinese NOCs and CDB from the policy banks. The borrowing country NOC 
changes depending on the loaned country. First, CDB loans the agreed amount to the 
recipient country NOC. Second, a CDB account for the borrowing country NOC is 
established, and the Chinese NOC is required to deposit payments for imported oil into 
the CDB account. The CDB then uses these payments to service the loans. The total 
monetary value of the oil imported by the Chinese NOC is greater than the loaned 
amount. CDB has the authority to deduct the loan service payments from the account of 
the borrowing country NOC. Once the loaned amount along with the interest is recovered 
by the CDB, the borrowing country NOC is free to withdraw the rest of the sum. (Alves, 
2013). 
These deals are also characterized by the fact that they have lower interest rates 
for loans than market-accepted rates for the borrowing countries. They are typically 
stretched over one or two decades, which gives China guaranteed oil supplies for a long 
time and the borrowing country a longer repayment time. A graphical representation of 
the structure is as follows:  
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 (Jiang & Cinton, 2011) 
Figure 4: Structure of a Loan-for-Oil Deal  
These deals are a product of the frequent coordination between the State Council 
and state-owned entities to achieve their individual objectives (Downs, 2011).  The State 
has tried to harmonize individual state entities interests along with its petroleum interests. 
A number of Chinese bureaucracies are engaged in finalizing these loan-for-oil deals, 
such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, National Development & 
Reform Commission, National Energy Commission, and the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, along with the NOCs and Policy banks. These deals have been successful in 
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securing commitment for oil supplies for the future along with memorandums-of-
understanding for energy co-operation with various oil-rich countries (Kong, 2010).  
For the purpose of this thesis, I will examine three of these deals in detail to 
analyze my hypotheses stated earlier. These deals have been discussed earlier in the 
background section; however, here I will be stating the structure in greater detail, i.e. the 
government entities involved and the interest rates that were offered. I will then test the 
two hypotheses that I stated in the introduction for each of the three deals in the next two 
sections.  
1. Deal 1:  
In April 2010, Venezuela and China entered into a “Loan for Oil” agreement. 
China Development Bank agreed to lend Venezuelan NOC Petroleos de Venezuela 
(PDVSA) $20 billion at a rate of 285 bps over LIBOR (Gallagher, Irwin, & Koleski, 
2012). In return PDVSA promised to supply CNPC with 200,000 barrels of oil per day 
for the next 10 years at prevailing market prices. This loan was extended for a joint 
venture between PDVSA and CNPC to develop the Junin 4 block on the Orinoco belt. 
Some of the money was also to be used for the development of infrastructure such as 
power plants and freeways (Jiang & Cinton, 2011).  
2. Deal 2: 
 In February 2009, Russia and China entered into a “Loan for Oil” agreement. 
China Development Bank agreed to lend $25 billion for 20 years at a fixed rate of 569 
bps. As a part of the oil sale agreement, Rosneft agreed to supply CNPC 301,000 barrels 
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of oil per day, and Transneft built a pipeline linking the East Siberia-Pacific pipeline 
system to China’s Daqing Oil field (IEA). 
3. Deal 3:  
In February 2009, Brazil and China entered into a “Loan for Oil” agreement. 
CDB lent Brazil’s NOC Petrobras $10 billion for ten years at a rate of 6% (Jiang & 
Cinton, 2011). The purpose of the loan was to finance a part of Brazil’s pre-salt business 
plan 2009-2013 (Bloomberg, 2009) (Gallagher, Irwin, & Koleski, 2012). Brazil in turn 
agreed to supply China 150,000 barrels of oil per day for the first year, and 200,000 











Hypothesis 1: If China enters into loan-for-oil deals, then it is aiming to 
build friendships with oil-resource rich countries to advance its 
objective of oil-linked energy security.  
Prediction: It is predicted that these loan-for-oil deals enhance China’s oil-linked energy 
security, i.e. they contribute towards continuity of oil supply at a reasonable price. It is 
also predicted that China has provided some kind of incentives to oil exporting nations to 
enter into loan-for-oil deals that are beneficial for China.   
I. IMPORTANCE OF OIL IN THE CHINESE ECONOMY 
This sub-section aims to highlight the importance of oil as a resource in China’s 
economy. It discusses the reasons why China is concerned about oil-linked energy 
security in the future.    
Currently China’s oil consumption is 10.221 million barrels per day, accounting 
for 11.7% of total world oil consumption. It is the second largest consumer of oil, trailing 
behind the United States of America, which consumes 18.555 million barrels per day, 
almost 19.8% of total oil consumption (BP, 2013). A report by Wood Mackenzie 
forecasts that China will consume more oil than the U.S. by 2017 (Forbes, 2013). As of 
2012, China imported 6.066 million barrels of oil daily (BP, 2013). Wood Mackenzie 
predicts that between 2005 and 2020, China’s oil imports will increase from 2.5 million 
barrels per day to 9.2 million barrels per day, whereas U.S. imports will fall from 10.1 
million barrels per day to 6.8 million barrels per day. This means a 360% increase for 
China over this period as opposed to a 32% decline for the USA (Wood Mackenzie, 
2013). The statistics show that oil consumption for the second largest consumer of oil is 
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increasing and will surpass the current largest consumer of oil soon, due to an expected 
increase in oil demand for China.  
China’s current GDP is $8.229 trillion; it has grown 1,585% since 1992, the last 
year that China exported oil. China’s GDP growth rate in 2012 was 7.8% (The World 
Bank , 2012). ExxonMobil, in its outlook to 2040, predicts that China’s GDP will 
increase to about $22 trillion by 2040, an increase of almost 168% percent from current 
levels, averaging about 6% of annual growth in the future. The expected increase in GDP 
will lead to an increase in energy demand, mostly led by rapid urbanization. ExxonMobil, 
in its annual energy outlook states that as societies advance, people shift towards urban 
centers from rural areas. As people move from under developed rural areas to urban 
areas, their need of transportation through vehicles increases, leading to an increase in 
demand for oil. This has been the case in China. In 1990, 25 percent of the people lived 
in urban areas and the number had increased to 50 percent by 2010. By 2040, China’s 
urbanization rate is projected to reach about 75 percent (ExxonMobil, 2013). Rapid 
urbanization leads to an increase in demand for air travel as well as ground 
transportation, leading to an increased appetite for oil in China (Burgos Cáceres & Ear, 
2013). In 2010, for every 100 people in China, there were 5 light-duty vehicles. This 
number is expected to increase by 500 times in 2040 (ExxonMobil, 2013). The chart 
below shows that as GDP per capita increases for an economy, the people start to own 




Figure 5: Vehicle Penetration 2000-2040 
Whereas by 2040 all countries are expected to see an increase in demand for 
commercial transportation energy, China is expected to see the largest increase of about 4 
million barrels of oil equivalent per day. It is expected to surpass Europe, U.S.A. and the 
Middle East in terms of energy demand for commercial transportation. Most of the 
demand for transportation fuel will continue to be from gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and fuel 
oil, with demand for diesel expected to increase by 75% mostly because of its use in 
trucks and other commercial modes of transportation (ExxonMobil, 2013).  
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China is well aware of the importance and criticality of oil and is concerned about 
the security of oil supply and prices. The Chinese president Hu Jintao in a G8 meeting 
held in Russia said, “The international community should take joint efforts to ensure 
global energy security that is crucial to the economic growth and people's livelihood of 
all countries, the world peace and stability, and common development” (Gov.Cn, 2006). 
Also, Zhang Guobao, former head of China’s National Energy Administration, 
emphasized the importance of oil for China, noting, “Oil security is the most important 
part of achieving energy security.” (Hashem, 2013).  
Since the increased oil demand in the future will not be met by domestic sources, 
to sustain its economic growth China is forced to go abroad in search of energy sources. 
In this paragraph China’s refining capacity will be discussed to display the Chinese 
government’s efforts to meet its growing oil demand and to highlight the importance it 
pays to oil as a commodity.  As has been discussed earlier, China became an oil importer 
in 1993, and the requirement grew each year since then due to rapid growth in the 
economy. China was quick to respond to this supply-demand gap of oil and took 
measures to increase its refining capacity for crude oil. Imported crude oil needs to be 
refined to be fit for domestic use, and the market for trading refined products is much 
smaller than crude oil trade. It is interesting to note from the graph below that China’s 
refinery capacity has grown in line with its oil consumption growth, making sure that it 
has ample capacity to refine imported crude oil to meet its growing domestic oil needs. It 
can be observed that the gap between refining capacity and oil consumption narrowed in 
2000, continued to widen till 2007, before narrowing again in 2008. Crude oil production 
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in comparison to growth in oil consumption seems to have stagnated or has shown very 
little growth (Speed & Roland, 2011). This implies that the government was prepared for 
an increase in crude oil imports to meet its current domestic needs. 
 
(Speed & Roland, 2011) 
Figure 6: Oil Consumption and Refinery Growth in China 
Oil differs from other commodities that China needs for its economic growth, 
such as bauxite, iron-ore, copper etc.  First, oil is the number one fuel of choice for 
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transportation. Whereas natural gas and bio-fuels are upcoming alternative fuels, they are 
still as of right now not a viable alternative to oil, as currently oil is used to make jet fuel 
and diesel, critical for airplanes and trucks, and most light-duty vehicles are expected to 
use petroleum in the future. Also currently countries find it difficult to switch their 
existing petroleum-related infrastructure such as gasoline pumps, etc., to natural gas or 
any other fuels. The physical properties of oil make it a preferable fuel for transportation 
due to its high quantity of energy per unit volume. Second, oil is easily transportable 
from one point to another, i.e. by ships and pipelines as compared to the next best 
alternative fuel, i.e. natural gas. There is a growing Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) market 
that may solve the problem of transportability of natural gas and may put it at a 
competitive edge to oil, but the LNG market is complex and requires substantial amounts 
of investments in exporting and importing countries. Also, natural gas does not seem to 
be a feasible substitute for jet fuel at the moment, which is currently a growing need for 
China. China differentiates from other oil importing countries because it changed from 
the status of an oil exporter to the world’s second largest oil importer in a short span of 
time; this left the Chinese government vulnerable to oil supply shocks and concerned 
about their energy security (Speed & Roland, 2011). Third, China occupies a dominant 
position in the minerals market as compared to the oil market, leading it to be more 
concerned about oil than other commodities. If China were to reduce its demand for iron 
ore, bauxite or copper, that would be a cause of great concern for the producers, leading 
China to have greater power to dictate the minerals market than it does in the oil market. 
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The oil market has several countries as demand drivers due to which China does not 
enjoy a domineering role (Economy & Levi, 2014).  
It can be deduced from the above information that China’s high expected GDP 
growth will lead to rapid urbanization, leading to more demand for oil in the future. It is 
expected that it will have the largest increase in demand for commercial transportation 
vehicles. Oil is an easily transportable and a preferred fuel of choice for transportation, 
and a sought after commodity which is critical for China’s GDP growth. Now that we 
have established the importance of oil in the Chinese economy, the following sub-
sections will test if these loan-for-oil deals enhance China’s oil-linked energy security. 
II. CHINA’S QUEST FOR OIL MAY LEAD TO OIL PRICE STABILITY 
This section discusses whether the loan-for-oil deals enhance China’s oil-linked 
energy security. China has provided these loans for the development of oil reserves that 
are not conventional oil reserves, such as heavy oil fields in Venezuela and oil from pre-
salt reservoirs in Brazil. China’s quest for oil provides financing for exploring in areas 
where traditional drilling does not take place, and it leads to producing more oil for the 
world. A greater supply of oil may put downward pressure on future oil prices. China is 
an obvious beneficiary of relatively lower oil prices, since it is the second largest oil 
importer in the world. China’s quest for oil is often perceived as a threat to oil related 
energy security of the world, but it may actually be beneficial in terms of increase in 
supply of oil (Burgos Cáceres & Ear, 2013). 
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Though China may eventually benefit in the future due to an increase in global oil 
supply, there are some points to consider. First, there is no guarantee that there will be 
stable oil prices due to an increase in oil supply by extracting from these unconventional 
sources; a lot will depend on future oil demand also. Second, China has no equity shares 
in these un-conventional oil reserves, so it does not have direct access to that oil. The 
loans-for-oil to Brazil and Venezuela do not guarantee an “uninterrupted supply of oil,” 
as there is no clause or project that ensures the security of supply from Brazil to China or 
from Venezuela to China. And China will have to pay market prices for the oil in the 
future, which will not necessarily yield an “affordable price,” as specified in the IEA’s 
definition of energy security. 
III. CHINA’S DEPENDENCE ON THE STRAIT OF MALACCA 
This section discusses how loan-for-oil deals might address Chinese 
government’s concern about China’s dependence on the Strait of Malacca as a transit 
route for Chinese oil imports. The loan-for-oil deals might help provide alternate routes 
for supply, thereby contributing towards the Chinese goal of oil supply continuity.  
The Strait of Malacca is a 1,100 kilometer shipping channel between the Indian 
and Pacific Oceans. It is one of the most crucial shipping lanes in the world. It is the 
shortest sea route to China for its oil imports from Africa and Middle Eastern countries. It 
is also used to transport oil to other major Asian economies such as Japan and South 
Korea. China currently depends on the Strait of Malacca for 80% of its oil imports 
(Burgos Cáceres & Ear, 2013). 
 28 
In order to reduce its reliance on the Strait of Malacca, China is working on a 
strategy to identify and form alternative routes for the shipment of oil. At the Central 
Economic Work Conference in Beijing in November 2003, the China’s then President Hu 
Jintao expressed his worries about the China’s high dependence on the Strait of Malacca. 
He asserted that some “Great Powers” were attempting to control the Strait of Malacca 
and that China must formulate new oil transport strategies to protect the country’s energy 
security (Kong, 2010). Some scholars have labeled these concerns and threats as 
exaggerated, as there are other low cost routes available for diversification from the Strait 
of Malacca, i.e. the Straits of Lombok and Makassar. This route is expected to add only 
10% of shipping time in comparison to Malacca if calculated from the Middle East to 
East Asia (Gholz & Press, 2010). However, as noted earlier, Chinese officials have 
expressed their concern about diversification from the Strait. One of the loan-for-oil deals 
analyzed in this thesis provides a loan for pipeline construction to Russia, providing a 
way for China to import more oil through a route other than the Malacca Strait. China has 








The graph below identifies important oil transport routes (sea and pipelines) for 
China.  
 
(People’s Liberation Army of China, Annual Report 2011) 
Figure 7: China’s Oil Transport Routes 
Although the deal with Russia provides a loan for an oil supply route alternate to 
Malacca for China, the “loan-for-oil”, i.e. the oil sale commitment at market prices along 
with the loan extended, does nothing to help the cause of diversification from the 
Malacca Strait. China could have extended a direct loan to Russia for the development of 
the pipeline, or had a direct share in the equity of the project or could have invested in 
other infrastructure related projects as a part of its diversification strategy from Malacca. 
It also does nothing to assure an affordable price of oil as the oil in the sale agreement is 
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sold at market prices, and therefore does not contribute to satisfy the definition of energy 
security.   
IV. CHINA’S LOANS COMPARED TO OTHER MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS & 
WESTERN BANKS / LENDING POST 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS: 
This sub-section discusses the incentives provided by China borrowers and the 
critical timing of these loans. It aims to establish that loan-for-oil deals are aimed at 
cultivating friendships with oil-resource rich countries. 
The authors of the book “The Hungry Dragon” note that China has entered into 
agreements with resource-rich countries that have oppressive leaders, weak governance 
structures and little consideration for human rights and environmental issues (Burgos 
Cáceres & Ear, 2013). China imposes fewer conditions on its loans than its Western 
counterparts and multilateral institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, etc. IMF and 
World Bank loans aim to reshape the projects and organizations they lend to, as a result 
of which they impose strict policy conditions for the borrowing country or organization. 
Compared to these loans, China does not impose such conditions, as its goals for the 
loans are not similar to those of the IFIs. China is not aiming to develop recipient 
countries but is providing them loans for purposes like heavy oil or pipeline development 
that are of interest to China. The loans may contribute towards the borrowing country’s 
development, but that is not China’s primary goal. Shen Zhiliang, China’s ambassador to 
Bolivia stated that it was China’s principle not to impose what he termed “political 
conditions” on foreign aid. Also Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez said that Chinese loans 
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differed from multilateral loans as they were “without strings attached” like financial 
scrutiny, in-depth monitoring, etc. (Gallagher, Irwin, & Koleski, 2012). The main 
conditionality attached to these loan-for-oil deals is the supply of oil at market prices, as 
discussed earlier. This is not comparable to policy requirements such as inflation control, 
targeted monetary policy requirements, etc. set by multilateral institutions, as oil resource 
rich countries are oil exporters anyway, and all they have to do is direct oil to China at 
existing market prices.   
Another important point for discussion is the timing of these deals. The major 
loan-for-deals were transacted during or after the year 2009, when the world was affected 
by the 2008 financial crisis. Not only were these loans borrower-country-friendly because 
of subsidized rates, but they were being handed out at the time when these countries 
needed them the most. China had been working to establish a relationship with Russia for 
almost 15 years for the development of the Russia-China oil pipeline, but the deal came 
into effect only after the 2008 Financial Crisis, when cash-strapped Russia also needed 
the loan (Tunsjø, 2013). It is interesting to note the timing of these loans especially when 
we consider the hypothesis that China is aiming to buy friendships by extending these 
loans to meet its oil-related energy security goals; the timing being after the 2008 
Financial Crisis for loans worth billions of dollars at subsidized rates would make the 
borrowing countries grateful to China and would foster deep relationships. It can be 
inferred that China in order to foster friendly relations with resource rich countries used 
the world financial crisis situation to its advantage.  
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By not imposing strict conditions on these loans combined with provision of 
subsidized loans of substantial amounts during a credit crunch, China can reasonably be 
seen to be aiming to develop friendships with oil-rich countries. The purpose of the loan-
for-oil deals may not fully satisfy the definition of energy security, but by entering into 
them, China is using the loan-for-oil deals as a tool to develop relationships and at the 
same time is able to highlight the importance of oil in these relations. These deals do 
provide China a promised quantity of oil sales in the future, are directed towards 
alternative supply routes to existing oil supply routes, and increase world oil supply, 















Hypothesis 2:  If China enters into loan-for-oil deals, then it is looking to 
diversify its financial investments from US treasury bills and views 
these deals as credible alternative investments. 
Prediction: These deals should have a positive net present value; even more, they should 
be expected to earn at least as much as Chinese investment in U.S. Treasuries. China’s 
return on investment by entering into these deals should be competitive and market 
based.  
 This section tests the hypothesis that China views the loan-for-oil deals as a 
financial investment. In 2009, China had $1.9 trillion in foreign exchange reserves 
(Chinability, 2011). More recently, as of December 2013 China holds $3.82 trillion in 
foreign exchange reserves and struggles to find alternative investments. It has been 
estimated that as of 2013 $1.3 trillion has been invested in U.S. treasuries. Chinese 
officials acknowledge the safety and reliability of U.S. debt instruments but have 
expressed their intention to diversify the foreign exchange portfolio (Salidjanova, 2014). 
This has not really been possible, as it is hard for the Chinese to find a market vast 
enough that can accommodate China’s reserves. The loans-for-oil have been extended in 
sizable quantities, i.e. billions of dollars at a time to multiple countries, and they may be a 
part of China’s foreign exchange portfolio diversification strategy (Salidjanova, 2014). 
This paper will analyze each of the three deals mentioned earlier in order to test this 
hypothesis.  
As discussed earlier, in April 2010, China Development Bank agreed to loan Venezuelan 
NOC Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) $20 billion at a rate of 285 bps over LIBOR 
(London Interbank Offered Rate) (Gallagher). In return PDVSA was to supply 200,000 
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barrels of oil per day for the next 10 years at prevailing market prices to CNPC.  
According to Bloomberg data, the USD Venezuelan Sovereign Curve for a 10 year 
maturity tenor in April 2010 exhibited a yield of 12.8%. If the 10 year US Dollar Swap 
rate in April 2010 was 3.822%, then CDB lent at a rate of around 6.672% (adding 
3.822% and 2.85%). 1 It can be inferred from this information that CDB gave a subsidy of 
at least 6.128% to PDVSA for this loan. The financial evaluation of this subsidy is a 
lower bound, because PDVSA will have a higher credit spread than the Venezuelan 
sovereign debt. 
 
Source: Bloomberg  
Figure 8: Venezuela Sovereign Curve 
                                                 
1 LIBOR is a floating rate benchmark that indicates the prevailing interest rate of a certain time period. For this 




Figure 9: US Dollar Swaps Curve 
In order to ballpark a figure for an absolute amount of subsidy given, we can 
consider the interest payments of the loan as an annuity, using the formula for Present 
Value of an Ordinary Annuity to calculate the cash flow per period “C1” that is to be 
received by China, when the interest rate “i” is at a subsidized rate of 6.672%. The 













We then calculate the Present Value as a second step, in order to calculate the 
Value of an Ordinary Annuity when interest rate “i2” is at the prevailing market rate of 
12.8%; we multiply the cash flow “C1” calculated earlier by the annuity factor when i2 = 
12.8%. We get a present value approximate figure of $15.745 billion for the transaction. 
Since the value of the loan allotted today is $20 billion, we can approximate that CDB 
subsidized the loan by an amount of $4.254 billon (by subtracting $15.745 billion from 
$20 billion).  
Moving to the second deal for further analysis, as described earlier, in February 
2009, China Development Bank agreed to lend $25 billion for 20 years, ($15 billion to 
Rosneft and $10 billion to Transneft) at a rate of 569 bps. The USD Russia Sovereign 
Curve for a 20 year maturity tenor in February 2009 exhibited a yield of 9.4%. It can be 
inferred from this information that CDB gave a subsidy of 3.71% to Rosneft and 
Transneft for this loan. The financial evaluation of this subsidy is a lower bound, as 
Rosneft and Transneft will have a higher credit spread than the Russian sovereign debt. 
C = Cash flow per period 
i = interest rate 




Figure 10: Russia Sovereign Curve 
The same method as stated previously is applied to calculate a figure for subsidy 
to Russia. We use the formula for Present Value of an Ordinary Annuity to calculate the 
cash flow per period “C1” that is to be received by China when the interest rate “i” is at a 
subsidized rate of 5.69%. We then calculate the Present Value of an Ordinary Annuity 
when interest rate “i2” is at the prevailing market rate of 9.4% by multiplying the cash 
flow “C1” calculated earlier by the annuity factor. We get a present value approximate 
figure of $19.16 billion for the transaction. Since the value of the loan allotted today is 
$25 billion, we can approximate that CDB subsidized the loan by an amount of $ 5.84 
billion (by subtracting $19.6 billion from $25 billion).  
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Moving to the third deal for analysis, in February 2009 CDB lent Brazil’s NOC 
Petrobras $10 billion for ten years at a rate of 6% (Jiang & Cinton, 2011). The USD 
Brazil Sovereign Curve for a 10-year maturity tenor in February 2009 exhibited a yield of 
6.9%. It can be inferred from this information that CDB gave a subsidy of 0.9% to 
Petrobras for this loan. The financial evaluation of this subsidy is a lower bound, because 
Petrobras will have a higher credit spread than the Brazilian sovereign debt. 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Figure 11: Brazil Sovereign Curve 
Using the same method, I calculate a subsidy figure for Brazil. Using the formula 
for Present Value of an Ordinary Annuity to calculate the cash flow per period “C1” that 
is to be received by China when the interest rate “i” is at a subsidized rate of 6.0%. We 
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then calculate the Present Value of an Ordinary Annuity when interest rate “i2” is at the 
prevailing market rate of 6.9% by multiplying the cash flow “C1” calculated earlier by 
the annuity factor. We get a present value approximate figure of $ 9.64 billion for the 
transaction. Since the value of the loan allotted today is $10 billion, we can approximate 
that CDB subsidized the loan by an amount of $ 0.36 billion (by subtracting $9.64 billion 
from $10 billion).  
The prediction that China views these deals as a financial investment cannot be 
accepted, as China has been subsidizing these loan-for-oil deals. Considering the fact that 
these loans were of sizable amounts and were being extended in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis, China had the option of lending at least at market rates if not above. 
Because China did not exercise that option, it can be inferred that China had other 
incentives linked to these subsidies. The loan-for-oil deals may address the issue of 
diversification from US treasuries as investments, but exclusively, they are not viable 
financial investments as they do not provide market based competitive returns.  
Also, these loans are backed by oil being supplied at market prices. According to 
standard financial practices, premiums are paid to buy call and put options, i.e. the option 
to buy below or sell above market prices. There is no cost to buying a commodity at 
market prices, other than the prevailing price at that time; no one should pay in advance 
for the privilege of buying at market prices. So neither leg of the loan-for-oil deals, i.e. 
neither the loans nor the oil sale agreements, is attractive from a financial standpoint. 
Moreover, an oil futures market exists right now. It is interesting to note that China did 
not fix the price of oil to be bought in the future, despite having the option to buy the oil 
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at fixed prices from the oil futures market. The total trade volumes of oil futures and 
options market in 2010 was about 268 million contracts, each contract size is of a 1000 
barrels i.e. a total of 268 billion barrels of oil traded (Ackworth, 2010). China’s currently 
imports about 6 million barrels of oil per day, i.e. roughly 2.190 billion barrels per 
annum, which is about only 0.8% of the total futures and options market (BP, 2013). 
Since futures contracts are traded on and mediated by an exchange, the exchange holds 
the responsibility for settlements of contracts and is responsible for any defaults or delay 
in settlements. There is no risk of counterparty default for China, if purchasing oil on the 
futures market. Alternatively, China could have used the futures curve as a benchmark 
for pricing for the oil sale agreement part of the loan for oil deal. Presumably, China 
could have demanded a subsidy in the price of oil purchased – for example, $2 per barrel 
below market prices – in exchange for its loans; that it did not do so suggests that China 
had non-financial motives for its investments.  
  
 41 
Theory of Hedging Framework  
This section aims to outline a few theories stated in the book Security & Profit of 
China’s Energy Policy by Tunsjo that will be used for the purpose of analysis in the 
conclusions section. I have chosen the theories in this book as they discuss China’s quest 
for oil in the international market and are in line with my hypotheses; by applying these 
theories to my conclusions I aim to further understand China’s motivations in the 
execution of loan-for-oil deals, which is the purpose of this thesis. Tunsjo in his book 
Security & Profit of China’s Energy Policy discusses a hedging framework that explains 
China’s quest for oil in the international market, considering both security of supply and 
search for profits. He states that China and its NOCs have a hedging strategy. The 
hedging framework comprises "long" and "short" positions. In standard financial 
definitions, a short position is for a bearish market view, i.e. one expects the prices of the 
underlying asset to decrease, and long is for a bullish market, i.e. when one expects the 
prices of the underlying asset to increase. The author views China's aim to be a dominant 
member in the international community as a “long” strategy, and close ties with oil 
producing countries as a "short" strategy, because China is paying a price for those ties. 
The Chinese government has diplomatic relations and security of oil supply as goals, 
whereas the NOCs have a profit motive. The theory of hedging framework is a 
combination of the “long” and “short” strategies deployed by the NOCs and the State to 
achieve their respective goals, i.e. profit motive for NOCs and security of oil supply and 
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diplomatic relations for the State. China does not trust the "longs," so invests in the 
"shorts" to maintain a balanced portfolio. 
The author Tunsjo states that the development of pipelines for oil transportation is 
a short trading strategy, as pipelines are less flexible and more expensive than sea borne 
trade for oil. The aim of pipelines that are developed for the transportation of oil has 
additional motives, such as to increase diplomatic ties across borders, which according to 
the author is a short hedging strategy, as one is trading profit for security. The author also 
differentiates between wartime risks and peace time risks. He views pipelines as a risk in 
peace time and sea borne trade as a risk in war time. Sea borne trade is a risk in war time 
as during war, several critical straits that are major oil trade choke points may be blocked 
by attacking States. Pipelines, however, are prone to peace time risks such as pricing 
conflicts, commercial competition and dodgy regional political relations. The decision to 
development pipelines is mainly a strategic decision, as pipelines are safer during 
wartime and also work towards cross-border diplomacy.  
The author also differentiates between threats and risks. Threats can be eliminated 
by proper identification and action but risks cannot be eradicated but only reduced. He 
views China’s energy security a problem of risk management. The example of a threat 
would be a blockade of China’s seas, in the event of which China would be able to 
identify it and use its navy and arms strength to eliminate such a threat. However, China 
cannot eliminate the risk of a war in the Middle East, blockage of an oil exporting 
country, speculation in the financial markets or other external factors not directly related 
to China that may spike the price of oil or disrupt its oil supply. It is not possible to 
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eradicate risks, but they can be reduced by proper management, and China is pursuing a 
strategy for risk reduction, not for elimination of threat (Tunsjø, 2013). 
The authors of the book China, Oil and Global Politics discuss two main 
categories of “threats” that face oil importing countries and two main ways to address 
those risks. The categories of threats are, first, an interruption to physical supply of oil 
and second the rise in the price of oil.  To reduce the expected value of these risks, two 
kinds of measures may be taken: first, measures that intend to reduce the probability of a 
risk event and second, measures that reduce the “negative impact” of a risk event (Speed 
& Roland, 2011). The main difference between the two types of addressing risks is that 
one is aiming for a “negative impact” event to not happen, and the second is aiming to 
reduce risk in the case of a “negative impact” event takes place. As pointed out by 
Tunsjo, many authors use the words threats and risks interchangeably; this is also the 
case for the theory stated in the book China, Oil and Global Politics. This thesis will 
acknowledge the difference between threats and risks and will refer to disruption of oil 
supply and oil price shocks as risks rather than threats, as the distinction is applicable in 
today’s world order, where countries are susceptible to external events that they may not 
have control over. In the next section, I will be applying these theories and definitions for 






Summary & Conclusions 
Studying the structure and motivations behind the loan-for-oil deals helps us 
understand China’s behavior in today’s world order. The first prediction that these loan-
for-oil deals enhance China’s oil-linked energy security, i.e. they contribute towards 
continuity of oil supply at a reasonable price, cannot be accepted in light of the arguments 
discussed earlier. In summary, while these loan-for-oil deals may support avenues of 
alternate transport routes for supply of oil in the case of the deal with Russia, they do not 
guarantee an affordable price for the oil exported as part of the deals and therefore the 
component of “for-oil” in the deal is irrelevant. There is no need for China to enter into a 
loan-for-oil deal, as China can directly loan or invest in infrastructure projects, such as 
the construction of the pipeline from Russia without having the clause for pre-sale 
agreement for oil. The pre-sale agreement just guarantees a certain quantity of oil to be 
sold, but does not guarantee the price it will be supplied at, along with there being no 
consequences in case the borrowing country defaults on its pledge to supply oil. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that loan-for-oil deals do not enhance China’s goal of oil-
linked energy security. In the case of Brazil and Venezuela, China does not have access 
to any oil equity in these deals, and loans-for-oil do not ensure security of oil transported 
from those regions. Investments in oil-related projects with Russia, Brazil and Venezuela 
could have been made without having these loans backed by oil supplies, or by 
negotiating a stake in oil equity for China. Also, the prediction that China has provided 
incentives to oil exporting nations to enter into loan-for-oil deals that are beneficial for 
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China is true. These loans were subsidized as proved in the section that discuses 
hypothesis two, had no strict conditions, and were extended in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis.  Based on these facts, it can be inferred that China is aiming to develop 
friendships with oil-rich countries. This leads us to deduce that the first prediction for this 
hypothesis is false, whereas the second prediction is true, leadings us to not accept the 
first hypothesis.  
The second prediction that China views these deals as a financial investment in 
order to diversify its investment of foreign exchange reserves cannot be accepted, as 
China has been subsidizing these loan-for-oil deals much below the existing market rates 
at that time. The loan-for-oil deals may address the issue of diversification from US 
treasuries as investments, but exclusively, they are not viable financial investments as 
they do not provide market based competitive returns. Also China did not fix oil prices 
even though there is an existing oil futures market for a point of reference, nor did China 
ask for some kind of a subsidy on prevailing oil prices. The two legs of the deal, i.e. the 
loan and the oil sale agreement, are not attractive from a financial investment standpoint, 
so we cannot accept hypothesis two.  
This thesis addressed two main questions. First, why is the oil being supplied only 
at market prices? And second, why are the loans subsidized? China has transacted the 
deals with different countries at varying subsidized rates. According to the data, 
Venezuela was provided a much higher subsidy than Russia and Brazil, i.e. the loan was 
subsidized by almost 6.128% in percentage terms, whereas the loans to Russia and Brazil 
were subsidized at 3.71% and 0.9% respectively. The absolute amount of subsidy given 
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to Venezuela is calculated to be at almost $4.254 billion for a period of ten years, to 
Russia at almost $5.84 billion for a period of twenty years, and Brazil $0.36 billion for a 
period of ten years. Along with increasing refining capacity in line with increase in oil 
demand, China has invested in new refinery capacity that is capable of refining heavy, 
sour, and high acid crude oils. Heavy oil is cheaper than light sweet crude oil in the 
global market, the average differential in 2010 was about $14.23 per barrel (Baytex 
Energy Corp. , 2010), and the additional cost of removing sulfur from heavy crude in 
order to meet China’s oil standard is only ten cents per barrel, leading it to be more 
profitable for China to import heavy crude oil than light crude oil. By incentivizing 
Venezuela through a loan-for-oil deal, China is strengthening its relationship with a 
trading partner that is a heavy oil exporter.  Also, CNPC entered into a $6 billion deal 
with PDVSA in Venezuela to set up a refinery in the Guangdong province in China to 
refine heavy and sour crude oil. CNPC also entered into a $5 billion agreement with 
Rosneft to build a refinery in the Tianjun province of China (Tunsjø, 2013). Having joint 
investments with foreign NOCs has two main advantages for China. First, the likelihood 
of defaulting on an oil supply agreement that is a part of a loan-for-oil deal decreases 
when the counterparty NOC such as Rosneft or PDVSA has a stake in the refinery that 
will process that crude oil (Tunsjø, 2013). Second, by partnering with international 
NOCs, China gains access to technology that may be useful for China for the 
development of its own reserves, especially complicated oil drilling activities for e.g. off 
shore drilling, potential heavy oil reserves in China etc. (Economy & Levi, 2014). This 
 47 
explains why loans to Venezuela are more subsidized than to the rest of the countries 
under analysis.  
The conclusion is that the loan-for-oil deals do not enhance China’s oil linked 
energy security, neither are they a viable diversification from investments in U.S. 
treasury bills, but by offering subsidized loans with relaxed conditions to oil exporting 
countries post the 2008 financial crisis, China is using these deals as an apparatus to 
develop friendships with oil exporting nations, thereby highlighting its interest in oil as a 
commodity. It can be speculated that the friendships formed as a result of these deals may 
contribute towards China's oil linked energy security goals in the future, however proving 
this conjecture is outside the scope of this thesis. 
In light of the hedging framework discussed earlier, the loan-for-oil deal can be 
considered a hedging strategy that can be either long or short depending on what aspect 
of the deal is analyzed. It is a short strategy as it aims to foster strong diplomatic relations 
with oil rich states at the cost of the subsidy of the loans. The deals however contribute 
towards development of oil reserves that may not be developed if China did not extend 
these loans. This may lead to more oil production in the future, leading to relatively lower 
oil prices, and China is a direct beneficiary of this situation, as it is currently the world’s 
second largest oil importer. The deals that are focused on only pipeline development, 
such as the deal with Russia, solely follow a short strategy, as they aim towards strong 
diplomatic relations, even though pipelines are a more expensive form of transportation 
than sea-borne trade, i.e. if oil is imported from counter-party other than Russia. China is 
not aiming to solve its problems of energy demand-supply gap, military security, and 
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over dependence on the Strait of Malacca by providing subsidies on these loans, but it is 
working towards a framework that will reduce the probability of “negative events” 
happening, and in the event that a negative event has taken place, it will reduce the 
impact of the negative event. For example, in case of a war or a blockade that threatens 
the Strait of Malacca; China will continue to import oil from Russia via the pipeline. In 
case of a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, where 55% of China’s oil imports are 
shipped, China will continue to have provision of oil supply from Venezuela, Russia, and 
Angola.  
China is following the hedging strategy of “Be nice today, you are unaware of 
future developments” by extending these loans-for-oil (Tunsjø, 2013). In order to hedge 
for expected and unexpected disruptions, these deals pursue a “win-win” relationship 
strategy. China was smart to transact these subsidized and “strings free” loans post the 
2008 financial crisis. These deals help China in forming a favorable framework for more 
agreeable long term co-operation (Weitz, 2013). Also China is aware of the fact that the 
likelihood of default is less likely as these countries would not want to lose China as a 
trading partner, and oil exporting nations are less likely to not follow through on pre-sale 
oil agreements at market prices. In order to meet its energy needs China is aware of the 
fact that it will continue to be dependent on imported oil in the future, and to meet its 
goal in the best possible way, it is using these loan-for-oil deals to establish relationships 
with oil exporting countries, even if these deals may not address its goal of oil linked 
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